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Location Constraints in Digital Rights Management
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Abstract
Digital rights management allows information owners to control the use and dissemination of electronic documents via a machinereadable licence. This paper describes the design and implementation of a system for creating and enforcing licences containing
location constraints that can be used to restrict access to sensitive documents to a defined area. Documents can be loaded onto
a portable device and used in the approved areas, but cannot be used if the device moves to another area. Our contribution
includes a taxonomy for access control in the presence of requests to perform non-instantaneous controlled actions.
Key words: digital rights management, access control, location, HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery

1. Introduction
Electronic devices for accessing information are becoming increasingly mobile. There are, however, a number of scenarios in which the owner of some information might want to restrict access to that information to
a particular geographical area. For example, companies
want to prevent sensitive trade secrets and intellectual
property from leaving the boundaries of their offices,
and publishing houses want to maximise the value of
their publications in different geographic markets.
Over the past decade, digital rights management
(“DRM”) has become an important technology in the
protection of copyrighted multimedia works, sensitive
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corporate information and private data. DRM allows
information owners to control the use and dissemination of electronic files via a machine-readable licence
that sets out the terms and conditions under which a
file can be used.
A licence for a file sets outs who may access the file,
what they may do with it, and under what conditions
they may do it. In this paper, we are principally concerned with licences that restrict the use of files to a particular geographical area, such as the physical premises
of an organisation or a particular legal jurisdiction. We
will give an overview of digital rights management and
location constraints in Section 3.
Enforcing location-based access control policies requires the access control enforcement point to be aware
of the movement of a mobile device during the exercise of a controlled action. We introduce a taxonomy for access control systems in the presence of noninstantaneous actions in Section 4.
We then present our implementation of a locationaware digital rights management system in Section 5.
Our implementation is based on the MPEG-21 Intellectual Property Management and Protection (“IPMP”)
Components [1] and supports non-instantaneous “play”
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actions by polling a trusted location information server
using the HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (“HELD”)
protocol [2]. The digital rights management approach
allows for location constraints to be imposed on electronic files in a straightforward and transparent fashion,
and use of the HELD protocol allows our system to
take advantage of future developments in location determination technology without the need for end users
to upgrade their devices.
Finally, Section 6 presents and evaluation of our prototype and discusses the issues facing the deployment
of a security system of this kind.
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Fig. 1. The components of a digital rights management system.

Al-Muhtadi, et al. [37] propose a location-aware access control system in which sensitive computer files
are encrypted with a secret key that is accessible only
in the region in which the files are to be accessed. This
approach has some similarities to ours, in which a secret key is only made available if the conditions of a
licence are satisfied. Our prototype, however, separates
the expression of an access control policy from its enforcement, which allows arbitrarily expressive policies
to be supported in a straightforward and modular way.
Tolone, et al. [27] point out the need for contextbased access control systems to account for actions that
take a non-zero time to complete, since the context that
enabled an action to begin may change prior to the
action being completed. The only systems of which we
are aware that implement access control of this sort are
those of Lee, et al. [38] and White, et al. [39], which
both implement what we will call the “event-based”
model. We will consider other methods of enforcement
and develop a taxonomy for them in Section 4.

Numerous systems have been proposed for determining or verifying the location of a mobile device. For
access control decisions, we require the location of a
mobile device to be verified such that a dishonest user
cannot fake his or her location. Many such systems have
been proposed, based on WiFi networks [3–11], GPS
[8,12–16], cellular telephone networks [13,15,17–19],
RFID [20] and other sensor networks [21–23].
Each of these systems has a number of advantages
and disadvantages relative to other systems. WiFi networks, for example, can provide very high accuracy in
indoor environments with existing networks, while cellular telephone networks provide lower accuracy but
higher existing coverage in outdoor areas. Furthermore,
the location technologies available to be used may vary
according the nature of the devices to be located.
In this paper, we are not concerned with the particular
method by which a device is located. We assume that we
have a trusted location provider able to securely locate a
device. The location provider may use any method that
it deems appropriate for the nature of the area and the
device to be located, without affecting the DRM system
discussed in this paper.
Many authors have also proposed models for access
control policies that include rules about location or other
context information [24–34], and both of most prominent languages used for writing digital rights management licences – the Extensible Rights Markup Language
(“XrML”) [35] and the Open Digital Rights Language
[36] – support clauses that constrain the use of a file to
a particular location.
Mundt [16] proposes a DRM system in which a device checks location constraints using an on-board GPSlike receiver. In our prototype, the location of the terminal is determined by an off-board location provider
that may use any technology deemed to be appropriate.

3. Digital Rights Management
Figure 1 shows our reference model for a DRM system. Information is created by a provider, and transmitted in a protected (for example, encrypted) form to a
user via some distribution channel. In order to access
the protected data, the user must obtain a licence from
the licence issuer.
Licences are written in a machine-readable rights expression language that sets out the terms of use of the
data and the information required to access the protected content. We use the MPEG Rights Expression
Language [40] in this paper.
The fundamental security requirement for a DRM
system is that the hardware and/or software used to
2

Context Information

Technologies for locating devices have varying degrees of accuracy, with errors ranging from less than a
metre for special-purpose wireless networks up to hundreds of metres or more for GSM telephone networks.
Inaccuracies in location information may cause location conditions to be enforced incorrectly by the access
control system: a user might be either incorrectly given
permission to perform an action if his or her terminal
is incorrectly located within a permitted area, or might
be incorrectly refused permission if his or her terminal
is incorrectly located outside the permitted area.
In the present paper, we assume that the inaccuracy
in a location measurement is insignificant compared to
the distance over which a device would need to travel
in order to defeat the system. For example, an error
of a few metres seems acceptable if leaking company
information to a competitor requires travelling to an
office several kilometres away. Some other suggestions
for handling inaccuracy in location measurements for
access control can be found in [34].
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Fig. 2. The components of a terminal.

access protected data be guaranteed by its manufacturer
to behave in accordance with licences. For the purposes
of this paper, a terminal is an abstract single-user player,
editor, or similar that may be implemented as a hardware
device, a software application or combination of the
two.
Figure 2 shows our reference model for a terminal.
When a user wishes to perform some particular action
on a particular item of data, the decision point checks
that the user possesses a licence that permits that action.
It further checks that the licence has been signed by a
recognised licence issuer, and that any conditions associated with the permission are satisfied. If a suitable licence does not exist, or the conditions are not satisfied,
the decision point will refuse to carry out the operation.
Otherwise, the enforcement point will be permitted to
retrieve the data key, and the renderer enabled to carry
out the desired operation.

4. Access Control for Non-Instantaneous Actions
In traditional access control, we tend to think of actions as being instantaneous. For example, a process is
either permitted to open a file for reading, or it is not;
there is no option to control the period of time (for example) for which the file may be open. Access control
systems with continuing actions appear to have inspired
interest only very recently [27,38,39].
In a context-aware access control system, it may be
possible to circumvent an instantaneous access control
decision by initiating an action while in an approved
context, then moving to an unapproved context without
completing the action. For example, a dishonest employee might open a document on a laptop computer
while in a company’s offices, then take the computer to
a competitor’s office without closing the document.
We define the precision of a non-instantaneous access
control system as the time taken for an access control
decision to be updated after a context change occurs
affecting that decision. In general, there is a trade-off
between the precision of a system and the cost of implementing it. We will discuss the trade-offs for individual
mechanisms below.
Note that the methods listed below are not mutually
exclusive: it is possible to implement a system in which
a device can both poll the context manager and react to
events sent to it by the context manager, for example,
or in which starting a new action forces an otherwise
poll-based system to obtain new context information.

3.1. Location Constraints
In general, the human user of a terminal, the enforcement point, the decision point and the renderer may
be separated by arbitrarily large distances – speakers
may be connected to a music player via an arbitrarily
long cable, for example, or someone may view a screen
through a telescope. For ease of exposition of this paper,
we assume that the renderer, decision point and enforcement point all are contained within a monolithic terminal whose components cannot be separated and whose
location can be securely determined, such as a laptop
computer or mobile telephone. It is possible, however,
to apply our system to non-monolithic terminals so long
as the decision point is able to determine the location
of renderer as distinguished from itself, as in [41].
3

4.1. Trivial Models

context-dependent conditions to re-checked every time
the user requests to perform an action.
Exclusion-based systems obviously have low precision, and are only effective if principals have an incentive to constantly perform new actions. However, they
can be implemented with very little infrastructure and
eliminate the need for the access control decision point
to be in constant contact with the context manager.

The trivial option is to simply allow an action to
continue indefinitely once it has been approved, regardless of any changes in context. Obviously this option is
only appropriate where the value of the protected data
is ephemeral.
4.2. Event-Based Models

4.5. Prevention-Based Models
The systems proposed by Lee, et al. [38] and White,
et al. [39] are examples of event-based systems in which
some context manager is able to notify the access control system when an environment condition ceases to
be true. For Lee, et al. and White, et al., notification is
provided by an existing ubiquitous computing network,
which may be expensive to implement if it does not exist already.
Event-based systems are very precise, but are obviously susceptible to tampering with the channel that
communicates events to the access control decision
point. If an attacker is able to mount a denial-of-service
attack on the channel, the access control decision point
may not receive an event indicating that an access
control decision must be reversed.

Rather than reverse an access control decision should
some relevent context change, an access control system
may be able to prevent context from changing by forbidding any actions that would cause an unacceptable
change in context. For example, upon opening a document that may only be read in a given room, the access
control system may cause the door to the room to lock
until the document is closed.
In many applications, prevention-based systems may
be prohibitively expensive, socially unacceptable or
simply impossible. Where practical, however, such systems can provide very high precision and security, and
may be useful in small-scale high-security scenarios.
5. Location-based DRM Prototype

4.3. Poll-Based Models
We developed a prototype location-based DRM system called IPLocDRM (for “Internet Protocol Location
DRM”). IPLocDRM allows information providers to
cryptographically protect their files in such a way as to
permit access only when the renderer is located within a
particular location. The DRM system on which IPLocDRM is based supports conditions other than location,
but we will only discuss the location condition in this
paper.

The prototype described in this paper is an example of a poll-based system in which the access control
decision point requests updated context information at
regular intervals. Polling can resist denial-of-service attacks by reversing an access control decision if context
information cannot be obtained.
Poll-based systems are straightforward to implement,
and precision can be traded against computational cost
by varying the interval at which new context information
is requested. We chose polling for our system due to
the ease with which an existing location service could
be incorporated into our application without modifying
the existing infrastructure, and because it is easy for the
licence issuer to make a good estimate of the required
polling frequency by considering the size of the area
described by a location constraint.

5.1. DRM Implementation
The IPLocDRM prototype is based on the Smart Internet Technology Digital Rights Management system
(“SITDRM”) [42], a DRM framework based on the
MPEG-21 Multimedia Framework [43] developed by
the Co-operative Research Centre for Smart Internet
Technology, Australia.
The MPEG-21 Multimedia Framework is centred on
the notion of a digital item, which represents a hierarchical collection of multimedia objects using the Digital
Item Declaration Language (“DIDL”). The IPMP Components define a mechanism by which vendor-specific

4.4. Exclusion-Based Models
A user can be given incentive to cease performing
an action by excluding him or her from performing further actions until the first action is stopped. This forces
4

Location information is provided by a Location Information Server (“LIS”) - a device capable of determining the location of an IP-enabled device within its network of influence, and respond to location requests using HELD. Our prototype uses the current open source
LIS under development by Andrew Corporation, which
is capable of providing location within a wired IP network [44].
The IPLocDRM Client (shown in Figure 4) is a
location-aware Java GUI application used by both the
information provider and licence issuer to create and
submit documents to the SITDRM document server
The document server then serves these documents and
licences in response to requests from terminals.
When the user (logged into a trusted terminal) attempts to perform an action associated with a location
condition, our IPMP tool requests the terminal’s current
location from the LIS. If the location condition is satisfied, access is granted and a periodic location checking
process is initiated to enforce this condition over an indefinite amount of time.
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IPLocDRM Client

location
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Fig. 3. The IPLocDRM system.

IPMP tools may be associated with governed (rightsmanaged) elements. IPMP tools are plug-ins that implement particular decryption, key management and other
algorithms. IPLocDRM adds a location-aware IPMP
tool that interprets location constraints and retrieves location information.
Licences are written using the MPEG Rights Expression Language (“MPEG REL”). Each licence contains a
collection of grants issued by some licence issuer. Each
grant awards some right over some specified resource to
a specified principal, that is, user of a resource. Grants
may be subject to conditions, such that the right contained in the grant cannot be exercised unless the condition is satisfied. We will describe the licences used in
our prototype in Section 5.3.
IPLocDRM’s cryptographic architecture is similar to
that used by other DRM systems. Every trusted terminal T is assumed to possess a public key KT whose authenticity can be verified using some public key infrastructure. The corresponding private key K̄T is known
only to the terminal; in particular, it is not known to the
human user of the terminal.
Every governed resource x is encrypted with a unique
symmetric resource key kx . Any licence that grants permission to access a resource x on a terminal T must
contain kx encrypted by KT , and be digitally signed by
the owner of x. In this way, only T is able to extract
kx and therefore x; and T will only accept licences that
were issued by the owner of x. Since T is trusted to
comply with the conditions imposed by the grant, only
the uses permitted by the grant are possible.

5.3. The Territory Condition
MPEG REL uses the Territory condition to bind
a grant to a geographic region. An example similar to
the licences used in our prototype is shown in Figure 5.
This licence permits a principal that possesses a private key corresponding to a given public key (omitted
for brevity) to “play” (view) the document urn:uow:
iploc:doc1 if his or her device is located at 1 Crown
St in Wollongong, Australia.
The prototype uses the civic location (that is, street
address) format due to the ease with which it can be defined by a licence issuer. This format, however, may lack
granularity for certain applications, such as restricting
use in non-urban regions such as parks and wilderness.
The HELD protocol also supports a geodetic (that is,
longitude and latitude) format that may be more appropriate in these scenarios.
Civic locations are compared by requiring all of the
non-empty fields of the condition to match the corresponding fields returned by the location provider. This
allows a match to be made if the location provider
supplies information that is more specific than that in
the licence. Geodetic locations can be compared using
straightforward geometric methods.
A Territory condition is composed of a single
LocationProvider element defining an external
service from which to request location information, and
one or more LocationInfo elements describing a

5.2. IPLocDRM Architecture
The IPLocDRM prototype adapts the existing SITDRM architecture, shown in Figure 3. The high-level
components are separated logically and communicate
via a network, using web services or (in the case of location information) using the HTTP-Enabled Locaton
Delivery (“HELD”) protocol [2].
5

(a)

(b)

(c)
Fig. 4. IPLocDRM: (a) protecting a document; (b) issuing a licence; and (c) adding a Territory condition.
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<r:license>
<r:grant>
<r:keyHolder>
<r:info>
<dsig:KeyValue>
<dsig:RSAKeyValue>
...
</dsig:RSAKeyValue>
</dsig:KeyValue>
</r:info>
</r:keyHolder>
<mx:play/>
<mx:diReference>
<mx:identifier>
urn:uow:iploc:doc1
</mx:identifier>
</mx:diReference>
<sx:territory>
<sx:LocationProvider>
<sx:Handler>
au.edu.uow.iploc.held.HeldClient
</sx:Handler>
<sx:Url>
https://lis.informatics.uow.edu.au
</sx:Url>
</sx:LocationProvider>
<sx:LocationInfo>
<sx:PollFrequency>
20000
</sx:PollFrequency>
<sx:CivicLocation>
<cl:country>AU</cl:country>
<cl:A1>NSW</cl:A1>
<cl:A3>Wollongong</cl:A3>
<cl:A6>Crown</cl:A6>
<cl:HNO>1</cl:HNO>
<cl:PC>2500</cl:PC>
</sx:CivicLocation>
</sx:LocationInfo>
</sx:territory>
<r:grant>
</r:license>

has two main advantages. Firstly, our solution does not
have to explicitly acknowledge any difference in scale
between locations. Furthermore, by specifying the poll
frequency at the time of licence creation, the licence
issuer has control over the specific value. When the licence is created, a decision can be made on an appropriate timing interval based on a number of factors including the total area of the restricted region, the sensitivity of the information being accessed, and any specific
organisational information or security polices.
6. IPLocDRM Evaluation
6.1. Channel Security and Trust
Since the accuracy of location information is critical
to enforcing a grant, it is necessary to authenticate the
identity of the LIS and ensure the integrity of the location information received. The HELD protocol provides
integrity and authentication of location information using the Transport Layer Security (“TLS”) protocol [45],
and this method is employed by IPLocDRM.
The integrity of the distribution channels used to
transmit a governed resource and its corresponding licence is less critical to the security of the system. As described in Section 5.1, a governed resource is protected
by a unique symmetric key which is in turn protected
by the terminal’s public key and stored in the licence.
Assuming that the terminal is trusted, we do not require
trusted distribution channels.
IPLocDRM allows the licence issuer to verify the
trustworthiness of the LIS, while the terminal must verify its identity at run-time. As mentioned in Section 5.3,
the licence issuer supplies the URL of a LIS deemed
to provided accurate location information by organisational process or policy outside the scope of IPLocDRM. When the terminal uses TLS to contact the LIS,
a decision must still be made whether to accept the presented certificate (and hence the LIS’s identity) or not.
It should be noted that the HELD protocol can determine the location of a trusted terminal, but not that of
its user. Terminals can, however, provide some assurance of the location of their users by rejecting access to
location sensitive information if a user is logged in via
some remote log-in service.

Fig. 5. An MPEG REL licence binding playback to a particular
location.

location and the frequency with which the condition
should be checked. This allows the licence issuer to
specify a location provider that he or she trusts.
For convenience, locations are described using the
Presence Information Data Format Location Object
(“PIDF-LO”) format used by HELD rather than the
similar format used in the MPEG REL specification.
Both formats only allow locations to be specified in
a positive fashion in that they specify where a device
must be rather than where it must not be. Negative conditions such as “playing is permitted if the principal is
not located in a moving vehicle” could be implemented
using a “not” operator, but our prototype does not yet
support this.
Binding the poll frequency to the defined location

6.2. Location Mechanism
Using an off-board location provider for IPLocDRM
allows the system to scale across multiple networks,
potentially using different access technologies. So long
7

as the terminal is in a network covered by the LIS that
is able to provide location with an accuracy acceptable
to the licence issuer, the system will work, and IPLocDRM can operate independently of the network that the
terminal is in without modification.
IPLocDRM uses polling to ensure that an action is
halted should a Territory condition cease to be satisfied. It is up to the creator of a licence to determine
the frequency with which polls will be conducted, such
that a user cannot make sensitive changes to his or her
location between poll events. Intuitively, we expect licence creators to choose lower frequencies for larger
areas, and higher frequencies for smaller areas, since it
would take a user a longer time to move from one large
area to another (e.g. from city to city) as compared to
small areas (such as buildings).
By this fact, we note that a poll-based model for
access control decisions is more appropriate when used
with medium to large restricted regions – such as an
entire office building. Restricting access to a smaller
scale region (for example, individual rooms within an
office) might require a very high poll rate and still lead
to imprecise access control decisions.
An event-based model, as described in Section 4.2,
provides more precise access control for smaller regions by detecting when the user moves and notifying
the access control system. Unfortunately, implementing
an event-based model using the HELD protocol is difficult, as all forms of HELD requests provide location
only when executed. Implementing an event-based (or
prevention-based) model requires an additional contextaware network to be developed and deployed, possibly
at very high expense.

The digital rights management approach allows new
conditions to be added to an access control policy in a
straightforward way, and allows all policy information
to be gathered and processed by a single component.
This allows the data protection system to be designed
in a modular and consistent fashion.
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[5] T. Roos, P. Myllymäki, H. Tirri, P. Misikangas, Sievänen,
A probabilistic approach to WLAN user location estimation,
International Journal of Wireless Information Networks 9 (3)
(2003) 155–164.
[6] P. Tao, A. Rudys, A. M. Ladd, D. S. Wallach, Wireless LAN
location-sensing for security applications, in: ACM Workshop
on Wireless Security, 2003, pp. 11–20.
[7] M. A. Youssef, A. Agrawala, A. Udaya Shankar,
WLAN location determination via clustering and probability
distributions, in: Pervasive Computing and Communications,
2003, pp. 143–150.
[8] T. Mundt, Two methods of authenticated positioning, in: Second
ACM Workshop on QoS and Security for Wireless and Mobile
Networks, 2 October 2006, pp. 25–32.
[9] M. J. Surminen, N. P. Sheppard, R. Safavi-Naini, Locationbased DRM using WiFi access points, in: International
Symposium on Communications and Information Technology,
Sydney, Australia, 2007, pp. 882–886.
[10] Newbury
Networks,
WiFi Watchdog, http://www.newburynetworks.com/
products-watchdog.htm (2006).
[11] Ekahau, Ekahau, http://www.ekahau.com (2007).

7. Summary
IPLocDRM shows how digital rights management
can be used to restrict access to electronic files to a
particular location. IPLocDRM’s licence interpreter is
independent of the form of location determination in
use, and allows licence issuers to specify which location providers they trust to deliver accurate and reliable
location information using the HTTP-Enabled Location
Delivery protocol.
IPLocDRM uses a simple polling mechanism to prevent users from defeating the system by opening documents in a permitted location, then moving their viewing device to an unpermitted location without closing
the device. Other mechanisms are possible, however,
and we have proposed a taxonomy for access control in
the presence of non-instantaneous actions.
8

[12] D. E. Denning, P. F. MacDoran, Location-based authentication:
Grounding cyberspace for better security, Computer Fraud and
Security (February 1996) 12–16.
[13] E. Gabber, A. Wool, How to prove where you are: Tracking
the location of customer equipment, in: Fifth Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 1998, pp. 142–149.
[14] B. Hulsebosch, A. Salden, M. Bargh, Context-based service
access for train travelers, in: European Symposium on Ambient
Intelligence, 2004, pp. 84–87.
[15] U. Greveler, Enforcing regional DRM for multimedia broadcasts
without trusted computing, in: Digital Rights Management:
Technologies, Issues, Challenges and Systems, 2005, pp. 345–
353.
[16] T. Mundt, Location dependent digital rights management, in:
Tenth IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications,
2005, pp. 617–622.
[17] M. Looi, Enhanced authentication services for Internet systems
using mobile networks, in: IEEE Global Telcommunications
Conference, 2001, pp. 3468–3472.
[18] C. Wullems, M. Looi, A. Clark, Enhancing the security
of Internet applications using location: A new model for
tamper-resistant GSM location, in: Eighth IEEE International
Symposium on Computers and Communication, 30 June - 3
July 2003, pp. 1251–1258.
[19] Ericsson,
Mobile positioning system, http://www.ericsson.com/
mobilityworld/sub/open/technologies/
mobile_positioning/index.html (17 February 2007).
[20] K. Nakanishi, J. Nakazawa, H. Tokuda, LEXP: Preserving
user privacy and certifying location information, in: Second
Workshop on Security at the Ubicomp Conference, 2003.
[21] N. Sastry, U. Shankar, D. Wagner, Secure verification of
location claims, in: ACM Workshop on Wireless Security, 2003,
pp. 1–10.
[22] T. Kindberg, K. Zhang, N. Shankar, Context authentication
using constrainted channels, in: Fourth IEEE Workshop on
Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, 2002, pp. 14–21.
[23] A. Vora, M. Nesterenko, Secure location verification using radio
broadcast, in: Eighth International Conference on Principles of
Distributed Systems, 15-17 December 2004, pp. 369–383.
[24] M. J. Covington, W. Long, S. Srinivasan, A. K. Dey,
M. Ahamad, G. D. Abowd, Securing context-aware applications
using environment roles, in: ACM Symposium on Access
Control Models and Technologies, 2001, pp. 10–20.
[25] G. Sampemane, P. Naldurg, R. H. Campbell, Access control
for active spaces, in: Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference, 2002, pp. 343–352.
[26] F. Hansen, V. Oleshchuk, Spatial role-based access control
model for wireless networks, in: IEEE Vehicular Technology
Conference, 2003, pp. 2093–2097.
[27] W. J. Tolone, R. A. Gandhi, G.-J. Ahn, Locale-based access
control: Placing collaborative decisions in context, in: IEEE
International Conference on Man, Systems and Cybernetics,
5-8 October 2003, pp. 4120–4127.
[28] A. Corradi, R. Montanari, D. Tibaldi, Context-based access
control for ubiquitous service provisioning, in: International
Computer Software and Applications Conference, 2004, pp.
444–451.
[29] E. Bertino, B. Catania, M. L. Damiani, P. Perlasca, GEORBAC: A spatially aware RBAC, in: ACM Symposium on
Access Control Models and Technologies, 2005, pp. 29–37.

[30] W. Han, J. Zhang, X. Yao, Context-sensitive access control
model and implementation, in: International Conference on
Computer and Information Technology, 2005, pp. 757–763.
[31] R. J. Hulsebosch, A. H. Salden, M. S. Bargh, P. W. G.
Ebben, J. Reitsma, Context sensitive access control, in: ACM
Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, 2005,
pp. 111–119.
[32] I. Ray, L. Yu, Short paper: Towards a location-aware role-based
access control model, in: First International Conference on
Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications
Networks, 5-9 September 2005, pp. 234–236.
[33] M. L. Damiani, E. Bertino, Architectural issues for a locationaware role-based access control system, in: ACM Symposium
on Applied Computing, 23-27 April 2006, pp. 1184–1185.
[34] S. K. S. Gupta, T. Mukherjee, Venkatasubramanian, T. B.
Taylor, Proximity based access control in smart-emergency
departments, in: Fourth Annual IEEE International Conference
on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops, 1217 March 2006.
[35] ContentGuard, Extensible Rights Markup Language, http:
//www.xrml.org (2004).
[36] Open Digital Rights Language Initiative, The Open Digital
Rights Language Initiative, http://odrl.net (2004).
[37] J. Al-Muhtadi, R. Hill, R. Campbell, M. D. Mickunas,
Context and location-aware encryption for pervasive computing
environments, in: Fourth Annual IEEE Conference on Pervasive
Computing and Communications Workshops, 13-17 March
2006.
[38] A. J. Lee, J. P. Boyer, C. Drexelius, P. Naldurg, R. L. Hill, R. H.
Campbell, Supporting dynamically changing authorizations in
pervasive communications systems, in: Second International
Conference on Security in Pervasive Computing, 2005, pp.
134–150.
[39] M. White, B. Jennings, V. Osmani, S. van der Meer, Context
driven, user-centric access control for smart spaces, in: IEE
International Workshop on Intelligent Environments, 2005, pp.
13–19.
[40] International Standards Organisation, Information technology –
multimedia framework (MPEG-21) – part 5: Rights expression
language, ISO/IEC 21000-5:2004.
[41] A. W. Dent, A. Tomlinson, Regional blackouts: Protection of
broadcast content on 3G networks, in: Fifth IEE Conference on
3G Mobile Communication Technologies, 2004, pp. 442–446.
[42] N. P. Sheppard, R. Safavi-Naini, Protecting privacy with the
MPEG-21 IPMP framework, in: International Workshop on
Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Cambridge, UK, 2006, pp.
152–171.
[43] International Standards Organisation, Information technology
– multimedia framework (MPEG-21) – part 1: Vision,
technologies and strategy, ISO/IEC 21000-1:2001.
[44] Andrew Corporation, Open source HELD: LIS and client,
http://held-location.sourceforge.net (2007).
[45] T. Dierks, C. Allen, The TLS protocol: Version 1.0, RFC 2246
(1999).

9

Adam Muhlbauer received BMath
and BCompSc degrees from the University of Wollongong in 2007. His
research interests focus on Location
Based Applications, Cryptography and
Network Security. He is currently employed by Andrew Corporation as a
software engineer, developing next generation IP Location solutions.
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini is iCORE
Chair in Information Security at the
University of Calgary. She holds a Ph.D.
in electrical and computer engineering
from University of Waterloo. Her research interests include cryptography,
computer and communication security,
multimedia security, and digital rights management.
Farzad Salim is a Research Fellow
in the School of Computer Science and
Software Engineering at the University
of Wollongong, Australia. His fields of
interest include privacy, policy consistency checking, access control and digital rights management. Farzad completed a M.Sc in
Computer Science at the University of Wollongong in
2006 focusing on redundancy detection and resolution
within a formal privacy policy language.
Nicholas Sheppard received BSc
and BE degrees from the University of
Queensland in 1996, and a PhD from
the University of Sydney in 2001. He
has since worked as a Research Fellow
at the University of Wollongong and
Co-operative Research Centre for Smart Internet Technology. His research interests include digital rights
management, privacy, and mobile computing.
Martin Surminen received a
BCompSc degree from the University
of Wollongong in 2004. He is currently
employed by Andrew Corporation as
a software engineer, developing next
generation IP Location solutions.

10

